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Abstract: Public policy is currently shifting from SME policy towards entrepreneurship policy, 
which supports entrepreneurship without directing attention to quantitative goals and specific 
firms or employment groups. The institutional framework set by public policy affects the 
prevalence and performance of both productive entrepreneurship and so-called high-impact 
entrepreneurship in turn. Although varying contexts and economic systems make prescribing a 
general panacea impossible, a number of relevant policy areas are identified and analyzed. 
Independent of environment, productive entrepreneurship should be rewarded and unproductive 
entrepreneurship should be discouraged. Successful ventures must also have the incentive to 
continue renewing themselves just as it must be easy to start and expand a business. In particular, 
we analyze regulatory entry and growth barriers, labor market regulation, liquidity constraints and 
tax policy at length. 
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1. Introduction 
After having been absent from mainstream policy discussion since the Great 
Depression, entrepreneurship was revived in the 1980s in research and policy circles 
alike. Spurred by David Birch’s influential 1979 study, research documenting the 
important role of new and small firms for job generation and innovative activity began 
appearing. Policy making in wealthy countries soon followed in its wake. People still 
believed that small and new firms needed policy protection and support relative to 
large firms due to size-inherent cost disadvantages. Moreover, it was also thought that 
market failure emanating from three types of positive externalities—namely network, 
knowledge and learning externalities
1—necessitated corrective policy measures.  
As a result, policy discussions and policymaking became focused on small firms 
and the incentive to become self-employed.
2 Small business policy or SME policy 
became selective, typically driven by government agencies with a mandate to assist 
specific types of firms, industries, or groups of people (unemployed, women, certain 
ethnic groups). Policy’s role was to ―ensure that small firms can compete in the 
marketplace and that they are not prejudiced because of their small size, relative to 
large firms.‖
3 Given this role, policy was evaluated using quantitative measures such 
as changes in the rate of self-employment, the number of start-ups, and other similar 
indicators.  
Yet new evidence indicates that a small share of all firms, sometimes called 
gazelles, generate most of new net jobs.
4 Acs (2009) shows that since the mid-1990s, 
these so-called high-impact firms have represented a tiny share of US companies (2–4 
percent). 
These developments have in turn influenced policy discussions. Rather than 
targeting small firms to compensate for their inherent disadvantages, policy has begun 
to shift its focus towards providing a framework for fostering a dynamic economy. 
                                                 
1 Audretsch et al. (2007). 
2 See, e.g., Storey (2003), and Cumming and MacIntosh (2006).  
3 Lundström and Stevenson (2005, p. 37). 
4 See Henrekson and Johansson (2010) for a survey of the evidence.   2 
What bundle of policies ensures that people can start new ventures, develop these 
ventures into high-impact firms, and expand existing ventures to their full potential?
5  
This chapter identifies the most important policy areas and measures likely to 
create a favorable environment for entrepreneurship, notably high-impact firms. As 
entrepreneurship policies do not target existing firms, our discussion will keep a 
systemic focus. Rather than discussing why entrepreneurship is important, we will 
address how public policy can stimulate entrepreneurial activity, with emphasis on 
productive entrepreneurship in high-impact firms.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 give a background to the 
following sections and discuss the differences between self-employment and 
entrepreneurship, and the differences between SME policy and entrepreneurship 
policy. Section 4 constitutes the bulk of the chapter, and discusses how an 
entrepreneurial economy can be promoted. It contains four subsections classified 
according to Baumol et al.’s (2007) four key tenets for the support of an 
entrepreneurial economy: Ease of starting and expanding a business, rewards for 
productive entrepreneurship, disincentives for unproductive entrepreneurship, and 
incentives to keep the winners on their toes. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Self-employment vs. entrepreneurship 
The meaning of entrepreneurship requires clarification, as does the distinction 
between self-employment (or small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs) and 
entrepreneurship. The terms entrepreneur and entrepreneurship lack an accepted 
definition, and are commonly used vaguely and inappropriately. For instance, the 
terms self-employment and entrepreneurship are often used interchangeably in 
empirical work.  
Two aspects of entrepreneurship deserve special attention. First, 
entrepreneurship stems from individuals and organizationsbe they new, old, large 
or smallthat actively renew and reshape the economy. Second, entrepreneurship is a 
                                                 
5 Hoffmann (2007, p. 140). This does not preclude that an entrepreneurial venture is sold to an 
incumbent fairly quickly. The full potential of a business idea will more likely be realized if it is sold to 
an established business with the requisite know how and financial strength (Norbäck and Persson 
2009).   3 
function, pursued by specific individuals who decide whether and to what extent they 
supply this function.  
The above distinctions underlie why self-employment or SMEs cannot be 
equated with entrepreneurship, and why they constitute a poor proxy in empirical 
work. First, in many cases, becoming self-employed is a second-best response to 
unfavorable institutions, and has thus nothing to do with entrepreneurial activity. 
Second, employees without an ownership stake can be entrepreneurial within an 
existing (large) company, although this seldom occurs unless compensation contracts 
provide the right incentives. Hence, self-employment is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to be regarded as an entrepreneur.
6  
The literature often distinguishes opportunity entrepreneurship—starting a 
business to take advantage of an entrepreneurial opportunity—from necessity 
entrepreneurship—starting a business because other employment options are either 
absent or unsatisfactory.
7 Regarding necessity entrepreneurship as entrepreneurship is 
questionable indeed, although it may become (opportunity) entrepreneurship at a later 
stage.  
Another distinction involves innovative and imitative entrepreneurship; 
innovative entrepreneurs introduce innovations in the economy (such as new products, 
new techniques and new organizational forms) whereas imitative entrepreneurs 
diffuse these innovations throughout the economy.
8 Even if imitative entrepreneurship 
should not be regarded as entrepreneurship by definition, purely imitative 
entrepreneurs seldom exist in reality as they often modify or improve the innovation 
(e.g., adjust the innovation to a new market or a new customer group). 
Productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship are also distinctive. 
The self-serving entrepreneur will pursue those entrepreneurial activities expected to 
generate the largest private return.
9 A highly profitable venture for the individual 
                                                 
6 See Iversen et al. (2008) and Henrekson (2007) for a further discussion. 
7 Reynolds et al. (2002). Sometimes the terms ―pull‖ and ―push‖ effects are used instead to distinguish 
whether individuals start ventures due to their lack of better alternatives or to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
8 See, e.g., Baumol et al. (2007).  
9 This maximization behavior does not necessarily imply narrow selfishness. The entrepreneur could 
care about the welfare of kin and friends, or even about the welfare of the general public. It suffices 
that the business decisions are decoupled from such considerations. The entrepreneur maximizes profits   4 
entrepreneur may, however, have a zero or negative social rate of return. Depending 
on the social outcome, an entrepreneurial activity can be classified as productive 
(social gains), unproductive (zero social gains) or destructive (social losses).
10 
Finally, it is crucial to stress the importance of so-called high-impact 
entrepreneurship (HIE). High-impact entrepreneurial activities commercialize key 
innovations or create disruptive breakthroughs, extract substantial entrepreneurial 
rents, spur growth (in both the firm and the economy) and employment, and shift the 
production possibility frontier outwards. In short, HIE significantly influences the 
economy. HIE activity occurs within so-called high-impact firms. Entrepreneurial 
firms with an exceptional growth trajectory are sometimes termed high-growth firms 
(HGFs) or ―gazelles.‖ Yet a typical start-up is not characterized by HIE; and high-




3. Entrepreneurship policy vs. small business policy 
Stimulating entrepreneurship and small business activity sits high on the agenda of 
developed and developing countries alike. This is striking given that large companies 
commanded attention during much of the post-war period. Recently, however, 
globalization has spurred focus on entrepreneurship. Increased product and market 
integration have thwarted efforts to protect incumbents, allowing successful 
entrepreneurs to extract higher profits. This, in turn, increases the lobbying power of 
potential entrepreneurs relative to incumbent firms.
12 Public discourse often regards 
entrepreneurship and small businesses as an economic panacea. While this view is 
exaggerated, it is fair to claim that productive entrepreneurship plays a key role in 
economic development. 
                                                                                                                                            
selfishly, but no constraint is put on the use of these profits. These may or may not be spent with 
altruistic considerations in mind.  
10 Baumol (1990), and Murphy et al. (1991). 
11 See Acs (2008) for an in-depth discussion of HIE. Acs claims that HIE should be an activity focused 
on (homogeneous) mass production within the product market sector. However, we find it unnecessary 
to restrict the concept of HIE to specific business activities and/or strategies. 
12 See Douhan et al. (2009).   5 
The government can wield public policy—namely, the use of tools by 
policymakers to influence society in a politically desired manner
13—to stimulate the 
economy. Entrepreneurship can be encouraged by efforts ranging from specific 
targeted support, such as technology assistance to small firms, to general macro 
policies to maintain a stable economic environment. 
It should be noted, however, that SME policy does not parallel 
entrepreneurship policy.
14 SME policy involves policies directed specifically at 
supporting SMEs (including self-employment), and can be justified on several 
grounds. It can be used to spur perceived positive macroeconomic side-effectssuch 
as increased employment, growth or innovation outputor to compensate for 
perceived negative microeconomic side-effectssuch as scale-economies or other 
cost and information disadvantagesassociated with the SME sector.
15 This policy 
approach commonly involves the creation of specific government agencies that 
support SMEs in a range of small firm support programs and subsidies.  
Entrepreneurship policy is a much broader concept. Its aim is not to stimulate 
firms but to support an economic system that encourages socially productive 
entrepreneurial activity by individuals acting independent of business form. SME 
policy influences quantitative aspects, such as the number of self-employed and small 
or new firms, and the size distribution of firms. This rests on the premise that more 
SMEs and self-employment is always better, since it increases entrepreneurship in the 
economy. Yet most definitions of entrepreneurship find no truth in this assertion. 
Pervasive small-scale businesses or self-employment would not benefit a country’s 
economy.
16 Moreover, searching for an ―optimal‖ level of self-employment and trying 
to steer the economy towards this level would be foolish as well. Such a level cannot 
be determined; even if it did exist, it would fluctuate over time and differ across 
regions and industries. It is not feasible to fine-tune a modern market economy in this 
manner.  
                                                 
13 Hart (2003). 
14 Lundström and Stevenson (2002). 
15 See, e.g., Storey (2003) or van Stel (2007). Audretsch et al. (2007) mention network, knowledge, and 
learning externalities as three examples of market failures that work against SMEs in the economy. 
Rodrik (2007) points to information and coordination externalities as one basis for government 
intervention. 
16 Audretsch et al. (2002, p. 45).   6 
As it is difficultif not impossiblefor policy makers to a priori determine 
who will be an entrepreneur, measures directed at a specific group or a specific form 
of business are largely misdirected.
17  
Public policy should not try to influence the ―natural‖ evolution of firm size, 
growth, or form through targeted subsidies or tax breaks. Market forces and profit 
motive alone should govern the evolution of firms.
18 Unless a substantial market 
failure that can be rectified through public policy exists, targeted programs should be 
looked upon with skepticism. A system replete with special treats and regulations for 
select categories results in a complex system with detailed rules, exceptions, and 
exceptions to the exceptions, which in the end impairs all activity due to increased 
administration and information costs. These costs are almost always more 
burdensome for SMEs because of the existence of a sizable fixed cost component.
19 
Moreover, complex systems provide opportunities for unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship. 
Normally, welfare increases if the economy allows and rewards productive 
entrepreneurial initiatives across the board, independent of firm and individual 
characteristics. A well-designed entrepreneurship policy facilitates productive 
entrepreneurial activities and enables the creation and commercialization of valuable 
knowledge.
20 Whether this implies a high or low rate of self-employment or SMEs is 
largely irrelevant. Instead of focusing on quantitative aspects of entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneurship policy should focus more on the qualitative aspects. Empirical 
evidence suggests that an economy that fosters (a few) high-impact entrepreneurial 
firms and high-growth firms is superior to an economy that tries to maximize the 
number of SMEs or the rate of self-employment.
21  
                                                 
17 Cf. Holtz-Eakin (2000), who claims that it is virtually impossible to clearly identify entrepreneurs. 
18 Cf. Holtz-Eakin (2000). 
19 EU (2007, 2008). 
20 Acs and Szerb (2007, p. 112). 
21 See, e.g., Shane (2008, p. 162), who states that: ―[N]ew company formation per se isn’t what matters; 
rather it’s the creation of a small number of super-high-potential new companies, which among them 
generate almost all the economic growth and job and wealth creation that comes from having an 
entrepreneurial economy […] A strategy that revolves around increasing the number of new business 
created every year is flawed.‖   7 
In many countries, public policy is currently shifting emphasis from SME 
policy towards entrepreneurship policy. Figure 1 depicts major distinctions between 
these two concepts. 
Nonetheless, the entrepreneur is not the only agent important for economic 
progress. Successful entrepreneurs who identify and exploit new ideas—thereby 
creating and expanding businesses—depend on a number of complementary agents, 
such as skilled labor, industrialists, venture capitalists and secondary markets. It is 
important to keep in mind that successful entrepreneurs cannot succeed without these 
complementary competencies and inputs.
22 Focusing on just the entrepreneur distracts 
from important factors necessary for an economy to prosper. Still, entrepreneurship is 
crucial; a lack of productive entrepreneurs cannot be fully offset by an ample supply 
of skilled labor or an extensive capital market.  
Quantitative policy goals have the advantage of being easier to evaluate. Many 
studies that evaluate support programs use a quantitative measure. They may, for 
instance, assess whether a certain policy has boosted the number of small firms. 
Academics prefer quantitative variables, as they facilitate both empirical and 
econometric analysis. Illusive qualitative concepts like entrepreneurship, however, are 
more difficult to handle.  
Evaluating and analyzing entrepreneurship policy is less straightforward. Be 
that as it may, entrepreneurship policy exists to stimulate job creation, innovation, 
social welfare and economic growth: lacklustre performance in these dimensions 
indicates a need of policy reform.  
 
                                                 
22 Johansson (2010).   8 
Figure 1. SME Policy vs. Entrepreneurship Policy 
 
 
4. Entrepreneurship policy 
The research literature identifies at least 25 factors ranging from labor market 
regulations to public sector size that influence the rate of entrepreneurial activity.
23 
Compiled systematically, public policy influences entrepreneurial activity in five 
different areas:  
  the demand side of entrepreneurship; 
  the supply side of entrepreneurship; 
  the availability of resources, skills and knowledge; 
  preferences for entrepreneurship; and 
  the decision-making process of potential entrepreneurs.
24 
Irrespective of classification, it is tricky to evaluate the effectiveness of different 
policy options. As discussed earlier, measurement poses the first problem. Second, 
different policy measures will likely interact, with ambiguous effects—policies can be 
                                                 
23 Lundström and Stevenson (2002). 




















Enable   9 
complementary, but they may also counteract each other.
25 Third, policies geared 
towards other goals may also influence entrepreneurial activity.
26 As the effect of a 
policy tool depends on the whole policy mix in the economy, it is virtually impossible 
to fully identify the factors affecting entrepreneurial activity; to quantify their 
respective effect is of course even more difficult. 
In short, context matters.
27 Political, economic, and cultural systems differ 
across countries, each of which has characteristics that cannot be replicated or 
imitated by public policies. Although using both cross-national benchmarking and 
best practice comparisons is worthwhile when evaluating different policy tools, doing 
so largely ignore the importance of context. Countries may have different binding 
constraints, and the importance of a particular factor may be greater in one country 
than in others. Therefore, ranking different policies as ―best practice‖ may at best give 
rough policy guidance and at worst be quite misleading.
28 
No time-invariant and universal general policy prescriptions exist that can and 
should be used to stimulate entrepreneurial activity. As entrepreneurship research is 
multidisciplinary and diverse, no generally accepted theory exists. Patterns can be 
traced between countries using suitable empirical and econometric techniques, but one 
must avoid drawing strong general conclusions based on this research. Even if several 
studies find one aspect to be (the most) important, this factor may not be similarly 
relevant in other economies not covered by the study.  
Time span poses an additional problem. Several studies have shown that 
public policy rarely influences entrepreneurial activity in the short run.
29 This can 
stem from cultural inertia but also transaction/switching costs, which make public 
policy towards entrepreneurship ineffective. Depending on the political time horizon, 
different policies may prove optimal from different points of view.
30  
                                                 
25 Orszag and Snower’s (1998) study of the complementarity of different policies in the area of 
unemployment provides an interesting parallel. They show how the effectiveness of one policy depends 
on the implementation of other policies. 
26 OECD (2007). 
27 Cf. Boetttke and Coyne (2009, p. 144). 
28 Cf. Rodrik (2007), Boettke and Coyne (2009), and Lundström and Stevenson (2002).  
29 Acs and Szerb (2007). 
30 Acs and Szerb (2007) state that information, opportunity recognition, and skill development are the 
most important factors influencing entrepreneurial activity in the short run.   10 
Even if a country’s culture can impede progress in the short run, cultural 
patterns are not immutable. Public policy can alter attitudes in a society over time. To 
the extent that norms and attitudes are culturally codified products of the reward 
structures in society, institutional changes are likely to affect norms and attitudes.
31 
Furthermore, the importance of culture may not only induce inertia but also produce a 
positive reinforcing feedback cycle. A more entrepreneurial culture generates a larger 
―demonstration effect,‖ a process in which people are exposed to (successful) 
entrepreneurs and are in turn stimulated to engage in entrepreneurial activities; soon 
more people are being stimulated, which strengthens the entrepreneurial culture even 
further.
32 Yet causality may run in the opposite direction. A vivid entrepreneurial 
culture is not a cause but rather a by-product of institutions that foster 
entrepreneurship.
33 Culture is a proximate rather than an ultimate cause; focusing on 
its role in spurring entrepreneurial activity is misleading indeed.  
These insights provide the backdrop for the remainder of this chapter. As 
context matters, we eschew a general ranking of best practice policies. Instead, we 
discuss a smorgasbord of factors that research has shown to be of importance.  
Many perspectives can color a discussion of entrepreneurship policy; as our 
starting point, we take Baumol et al.’s (2007) four primary tenets underpinning an 
entrepreneurial economy:  
  ease of starting and growing a business; 
  generous rewards for productive entrepreneurial activity; 
  disincentives for unproductive activity, and 
  incentives to keep the winners on their toes. 
All four tenets and their relevant policy tools will be discussed below. All in all, 
eleven public policy areas are analyzed in this chapter. Of course, the separate policy 
areas may influence several tenets at once; we have thus listed the policy area under 
the most relevant tenet in the text below. Table 1 presents a general overview of the 
policy areas and policy tools to be discussed. 
                                                 
31 Bowles (1998), Baumol et al. (2007, pp. 203ff), and Smith (2003). 
32 Audretsch et al. (2002). 
33 See Boettke and Coyne (2003, 2009) for a further discussion.   11 
Table 1 about here 
 
A final word of caution regarding the outcome of entrepreneurship policy is 
justified. Public policy has to strike a balance between different goals and different 
interest groups—tradeoffs are inevitable and must be dealt with. This is also true for 
entrepreneurship policy.  
 
4.1 Ease of starting and expanding a business 
Being able to start and expand a business with ease is vital in stimulating 
entrepreneurship. Public policy directly influences firm formation and expansion 
through laws and regulationsincluding direct prohibitionbut also does so 
indirectly through the social security system and labor market regulation. Public 
policy also stimulates entrepreneurship indirectly through measures that alleviate 
natural constraints, such as capital requirements.  
 
4.1.1 Regulatory entry and growth barriers 
Although natural entry barriers such as scale economies and capital requirements exist, 
government regulations can also impede new venture formation and expansion. 
Indeed, governments forge both direct and indirect entry barriers. Direct entry barriers 
refer to the act of restricting and even prohibiting entry into certain sectors of the 
economy (such as health care), while indirect barriers involve administrative costs and 
regulatory burdens imposed on new (and/or existing) firms. Expressed in another way, 
public policy can directly stimulate entrepreneurship by deregulating the economy, 
thereby increasing the opportunities for competition; alternatively, the government 
can indirectly stimulate entrepreneurship by easing administrative and legislative 
burdens, thereby allowing entrepreneurs to devote more of their time, money, and 
effort to productive activities.
34  
Direct barriers  
                                                 
34 Storey (1994).    12 
Direct entry barriers can be justified as consumer protection against fraudulent or 
incompetent business owners. Few would support a system in which anybody could 
work as a doctor, surgeon, or psychologist; strong arguments can be made for direct 
entry barriers for persons lacking requisite skills or know-how.
35 However, overly 
extensive regulations hamper productive entrepreneurship. Research indicates that 
occupational licensing, for example, may have gone too far, resulting in unjustified 
profit opportunities for license holders rather than consumer protection. Consequently, 
licensing may curb the rate of innovation.
36 
In recent decades, the governments of developed countries have deregulated 
product markets with the aim of increasing market contestability and providing more 
opportunities for private entrepreneurship within telecommunications, transportation, 
and financial services, for example. The scope for new high-impact entrepreneurs has 
thus increased dramatically.  
Yet one segment of most advanced economies remains heavily regulated and even 
monopolized by the public sector: the provision of social services such as health care, 
child and elder care, and education. This is so despite that these services are primarily 
private goods. As demand for these services increases as a result of aging and 
wealthier populations, the social benefits arising from productive entrepreneurship in 
these areas would be substantial.
37 Indeed, these industries already constitute 30 
percent of GDP in the Scandinavian welfare states, and about 20 percent in the 
OECD.
38 While several of these markets have been partially opened to private 
competition in recent years, many impediments still loom—private firms only 
produce a fraction of total output.  
Government monopolization of production frustrates organizational development 
and productivity. Typically, local or regional governments control production and are 
prohibited from expanding outside their own region. As a result, efficient 
organizations cannot expand geographically. Consumers (e.g., patients) in the region 
may also be restricted to using the local provider. Such policy generates small 
regional production monopolies controlled by the government. Efficient producers 
                                                 
35 OECD (2007). 
36 Kleiner (2006). For an early critique of occupational licensing, see Friedman (1962, chapter 9). 
37 The income elasticity of these services has been estimated to be as high as 1.6 (Fogel 1999). 
38 Adema (2001), Adema and Ladaique (2005), and Andersen (2008).   13 
cannot expand outside their local domain and inefficient public organizations continue 
to operate under little pressure to improve. Furthermore, government ownership 
decreases management interest in innovation, as they cannot reap the same benefits 
from these activities as private owners could (the producer is not the residual 
claimant).
39 
Hence, the public sector’s de facto monopolization of many income-elastic 
services has excluded vast areas of the economy from entrepreneurial exploitation. 
Part of this problem can be rectified by substituting private commercial firm 
production for public sector production, even if the service is provided free (or almost 
free) of charge to customers.
40 In addition, service producers can be permitted to offer 
additional services beyond what is granted through a tax-financed voucher system. 
This, too, would provide stronger incentives for entrepreneurs. Such a scheme would 
likely spur the emergence of new high-impact entrepreneurs in the health care sector.  
Near-exclusive reliance on taxation for the financing of health care, child and 
elder care, and education becomes more problematic as real income grows, since 
these highly income-elastic services suffer from Baumol’s Disease, i.e., their relative 
price tends to increase over time because they largely consist of labor intensive 
services with low or zero productivity growth.
41 Technological breakthroughs also 
increase the supply of services in the health sector. When private purchasing power is 
restricted from these sectors, they become tax-financed ―cost problems‖ rather than 
potential growth industries attracting talented entrepreneurs and other key agents and 
competencies.  
Even if private high-impact firms are not permitted entry into areas like health care, 
the private sector may still be affected by activity in these sectors. The public sector 
buys services and products for billions of euros each year; monopolized public sector 
segments are and can be a major market for many private firms and entrepreneurial 
initiatives. SME production commonly holds just a small share in these segments, 
which SME policy aims at increasing. Even if SMEs do not have an inherent 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Shleifer (1998). 
40 See, e.g., Jensen and Stonecash (2005) for an overview of public sector outsourcing. Even if only 
part of public production is privatized, the non-privatized part may improve. Bergström and Sandström 
(2005) have found that school results in Swedish public schools improved due to competition from 
independent schools under a voucher system covering all children. 
41 Baumol (1993), and Jansson (2006).   14 
advantage, public procurement policies should at least be as neutral as possible in 
regard to large firms and SMEs.
42 
 
Indirect barriers  
That extensive entry barriers deter business entry is corroborated throughout the 
empirical literature.
43 Entrepreneurship is facilitated if it easy and inexpensive to form 
(or expand) a business. Hence, administrative, legislative, and regulatory burdens 
should be as low as possible to stimulate entrepreneurship, save for regulation 
necessary to ascertain product safety and assuage distributional concerns.  
It is useful to distinguish between different entry barriers. The World Bank has 
constructed an index measuring the ease of doing business in different countries (the 
WBDB indicator). They use four variables: length of time, complexity of the 
procedures, direct cost, and minimum capital necessary to start a business.
44 Research 
based on this dataset shows that entry barriers discourage start-ups.
45 Despite that 
research shows that entry barriers matter, researchers disagree on which entry barriers 
are most important.
46  
Entry barriers raise both direct and indirect costs of starting a business and 
therefore constrain possibilities to exploit new opportunities. An entrepreneur will 
only found or expand a business if expected profits compensate for the costs and 
uncertainty associated with the project. Hence, increased regulatory and procedural 
costs raise the required rate of return necessary for an entrepreneurial opportunity to 
be exploited.
47 High costs deter potential entrepreneurs.
48 
Regulatory burdens do not only impede firm start-ups, but also the expansion 
of existing small firms.
49 Entrepreneurial firms are often smaller than mature, non-
entrepreneurial firms. Several studies have found that many SMEs struggle heavily 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., OECD (2007) and EU (2008) for a further discussion. 
43 Ho and Wong (2007). In a highly influential paper, Djankov et al. (2002) discuss and analyze entry 
costs across 85 countries. 
44 See, e.g., World Bank (2005a, 2005b). The methodology is based on Djankov et al. (2002), which is 
greatly inspired by de Soto (1989).  
45 See, e.g., Desai et al. (2003), and Klapper et al. (2004).  
46 Ho and Wong (2007). 
47 Dean and Meyer (1996).  
48 OECD (1998).  
49 Nijsen (2000).    15 
with administrative regulations SMEs.
50 Hence, a high regulatory burden penalizes 
entrepreneurial expansion.  
More than just the level of the administrative burden matters, however; 
ambiguous and opaque legislation—including vaguely formulated rules, frequent 
changes, and exemption clauses—also hampers entrepreneurial initiatives.
51 Many 
entrepreneurs lack the resources to devote their own time or pay an employee to cope 
with bureaucratic red tape and unpredictable changes and delays in relevant 
legislation.
52  
A high regulatory burden influences necessity entrepreneurship and 
opportunity entrepreneurship differently. Potential necessity entrepreneurs usually 
possess less wealth; regulatory costs can upset their financial status and deter them 
from entrepreneurship.
53 On the other hand, potential opportunity entrepreneurs 
normally possess more wealth, but they have more options (notably, to continue being 
a wage earner), which in turn makes them sensitive to start-up costs.
54 In contrast, 
potential high-impact entrepreneurs who expect large gains are less likely to be 
deterred by a regulatory burden, granted that the expected gain is high enough.
55  
However, costly regulation not only affects the level (and form) of 
entrepreneurship, but also its distribution between the formal and informal sector. 
Excessive regulation tends to push entrepreneurial activity into the informal sector, 
breeding corruption and stimulating unproductive entrepreneurship.
56 Lowering 
administration costs thus shifts business activities from the informal to the formal 
sector.
57 Given that entrepreneurship in the formal sector is preferred and more 
productive, lowering entry barriers and administrative costs stimulates productive 
entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
50 EU (2008). Crain and Hopkins (2001) found that the total cost of federal regulation in the US is 
about 45 per cent greater per employee in small firms (< 20) relative to large firms (> 500). 
51 Audretsch et al. (2002). 
52 Kauffman Foundation (2008). 
53 van Stel et al. (2007, p. 173). Ho and Wong (2007) claim, however, that necessity entrepreneurship 
should not be hampered by regulatory costs, as they are driven by lack of alternative employment and 
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In response, many countries have attempted to ease the regulatory 
environment to stimulate entrepreneurship by reducing the number of permits 
required to start a business, for example, or cutting the minimum time needed to 
obtain such permits. This has stimulated business creation in many countries.
58 
However, lower levels of regulatory barriers may also have counterintuitive 
effects. Rodrik (2007) has pointed out that the easier it is to start a new business, the 
easier it is to imitate the initial innovator and capture a share of his profits. If entry 
barriers are too low, the incentive to introduce innovations is too low as well. 
Research has shown that the number of new products being exported is positively 
related to the height of entry barriers.
59  
Entry barriers can also influence the quality of entrepreneurs and their 
ventures. More stringent entry requirements may increase the average quality of new 
ventures and their survival rate.
60 The more difficult it is to enter the market, the 
higher the chance of surviving and succeeding once a firm has entered. When entry is 
easy ventures with a lower likelihood of success are worth attempting. Hence, 
lowering entry barriers may increase the quantity of entrepreneurs but decrease their 
quality. In theory low entry barriers could therefore have a detrimental effect on the 
aggregate economy. However, we deem that this is unlikely to be the case in practice. 
It is also easy to find research which shows that the quality does not deteriorate when 
entry requirements are relaxed.
61 
4.1.2 Liquidity and capital constraints 
Entrepreneurial activity hinges on accessing and raising capital of the right kind. 
Numerous studies show that access to capital is the most significant obstacle for many 
business launches.
62 Yet many start-ups do not require much capital; financial 
constraints do not pose a problem for many new businesses.
63 Advances in ICT have 
also reduced minimum capital requirements in many markets.
64 As it stands, capital 
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tends to constrain high-growth firms more
65 because they often require sizable 
infusions of funds to sustain growth. Liquidity constraints also become more binding 
as companies get smaller.
66 
In the EU, entrepreneurs and SMEs rank financing as their second most 
important concern after administrative burden.
67 The United States’ highly developed 
financial system has indeed been cited as responsible for the emergence of its 
successful entrepreneurial economy.
68 
The general problem 
Banks normally demand collateral-based lending. This requires that the potential 
entrepreneur has enough resources of his own to invest in the project or to use as 
collateral. A mixture of information asymmetries and the inherent risk of 
entrepreneurial projects lies at the heart of the problem. A potential entrepreneur 
understands more about his own ability and his entrepreneurial investment project 
than his prospective lender. Reducing the obstacle of asymmetric information by 
screening (by the potential lender) and signaling (by the potential entrepreneur) can be 
problematic because of the entrepreneur’s lack of a track record or the difficulty of 
evaluating his project.  
Entrepreneurs can circumvent the asymmetric information problem by 
investing personal resources in the project, as this signals that the entrepreneur 
believes that the project has a high likelihood of success. Banks do normally also 
demand collateral-based lending. This obviously requires that the potential 
entrepreneur has enough resources of his own to invest in the project or to use as 
collateral. Hence, own financing or collateral lending may signal both high confidence 
in the project and access to wealth. However, potential entrepreneurs without enough 
wealth cannot signal confidence in this way (even if they have high faith in their 
project). 
From a first-best perspective, the desirable outcome is obvious: good projects 
should be funded, bad ones should not. Good projects should be pursued even if the 
                                                 
65 Baumol et al. (2007, p. 205). 
66 Fazzari et al. (1988).  
67 EU (2008). 
68 Kauffman Foundation (2007, p. 34).   18 
entrepreneur lacks requisite funds. (And bad projects should not be pursued even if 
the entrepreneur has the necessary resources.) Not all projects should be financed. A 
failure to raise funds is by no means an example of market failure or capital market 
malfunction. The credit market functions as an initial filter, screening out the most 
unrealistic and overly optimistic projects. A bank or a venture capitalist, with many 
years of experience financing entrepreneurial ventures, may make better judgments 
than a first-time entrepreneur.
69 Moreover, many entrepreneurs are grossly 
overoptimistic about the future success of their projects.
70  
Research has found that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur increases 
with wealth—financial constraints curtail entrepreneurial activity. However, causality 
may run in the other direction; wealthier persons may be more likely to be better 
entrepreneurs on average.
71 Other studies have also shown that receiving an 
inheritance does not increase one’s likelihood of starting a business, which casts doubt 
on the importance of financial constraints.
72  
Although these objections must be considered, it would be too harsh to 
conclude that financial constraints never pose a problem. Even if an appropriate 
amount of projects are funded, their quality could still leave much to be desired. After 
all, the problem could be qualitative rather than quantitative. Plenty of other research 
indicates that capital resources increase the ability to survive and expand.
73 
This first-best perfect information approach, which underlies some of the 
arguments above, may also be misleading. It is impossible to know ex ante whether a 
project will be successful. Testing new ideas in the marketplace is the entrepreneur’s 
fundamental task—in practice, all failed projects do not represent a waste of resources 
or a market failure. However, every opportunity to use scarce resources more 
efficiently thwarted by financial constraints gives rise to a welfare loss. Being an 
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agent of change who combines production factors in novel ways, the entrepreneur 
holds center stage in the market’s selection process.  
Financing entrepreneurship in practice 
A start-up’s success relies on the availability of equity financing. In general, reliance 
on equity rather than debt financing increases with risk. The smaller and newer the 
firm is, the more difficult it is for outside financiers to assess the viability and 
profitability of the venture. Thus, ceteris paribus, small and newly established firms 
are more dependent on equity financing than large, well-established firms. 
Entrepreneurial start-ups struggle to raise funds from large financial 
institutions and thus often rely on insider and internal funding in the enterprise’s 
nascency. Internal financing can be increased in this phase by pursuing economic 
policies that promote private wealth accumulation in forms that do not preclude the 
assets from being used as equity in entrepreneurial ventures.
74  
Research strongly suggests that incentives for individual wealth accumulation 
would likely increase entrepreneurial activity.
75 Low private savings exacerbate the 
inherent problem caused by asymmetric information, as discussed above. Wealth-
constrained would-be entrepreneurs are unable to forcibly signal their project’s worth 
to outside investors by means of making sizeable equity infusions of their own or, if 
needed, to fully finance the firm until organic growth based on retained earnings is 
possible.  
Informal investors, mainly so-called business angels, fill this gap between 
internal funding and formal venture capital financing. New research has shown that 
the availability of these informal investors is crucial in overcoming liquidity 
constraints.
76 The United Kingdom has in particular used tax reliefs and generous 
deductions to encourage business angel investments.
77  
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Venture capital firms play a pivotal role in the development of small 
entrepreneurial ventures by converting high-risk opportunities to a more acceptable 
risk level through portfolio diversification and adding key competencies that the firm 
may be lacking. Although the importance of the formal venture capital industry has 
increased over time, its extent is still rather modest.
78 As already noted, many 
entrepreneurial firms are too small for venture capital funding. Yet venture capital 
retains importance for high-performing and high-growth entrepreneurial firms.
79 
Venture capital is often superior to bank finance since it also provides key expertise 
and access to networks important for entrepreneurial high-risk firms.
80 
The venture capital industry is less developed in Europe than in the US.
81 This 
may occur because European business owners are less prone to accept loss of control, 
a normal implication of venture capital support.
82 US firms also grow faster than their 
European counterparts, which tend to remain small.
83 
The government can support the venture capital industry both directly and 
indirectly.
84 The government can use tax revenues to directly provide venture capital 
to the market, either through state controlled organizations or together with private 
actors. The government could in particular support the supply of early stage (seed) 
capital—which the formal venture capital industry typically does not provide—
through public interventions.  
However, there is reason to be skeptical of this kind of direct support. Any 
support system must contain elements of rationing and selection in order to avoid 
moral hazard problems of unmanageable proportions. No recipe dictates how to ―pick 
the winners‖ and support the right investments. On the contrary, the process of 
evaluation in the private venture capital industry is both highly complex and 
sophisticated, and often includes tacit judgments. The industry is at best moderately 
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successful in picking the winners among high-risk projects, despite their 
specialization in this area.
85  
Neither theory nor practice indicate that politically controlled organizations 
are better able than the private venture capital industry (or business angels) to assess 
the likelihood of business success. On the contrary, politically controlled 
organizations might—directly or indirectly, openly or furtively, partly or 
completely—base their decisions on political rather than commercial criteria and 
therefore underperform.
86 Examples of politically controlled organizations that have 
outperformed private organizations in this area are hard to find.
87 To counter this 
objection, state-governed venture capital could be compelled to only fund firms that 
also receive private funding in order to copy and reinforce the emerging funding 
structure on the market.
88 
The government can also support the venture capital industry indirectly. It 
could, for example, stimulate the private venture capital industry through tax policy. 
The 1980s witnessed the rapid growth of the US venture capital industry in just this 
fashion, spurred by large cuts in capital gains taxes.
89 Around 1980, the US legal 
framework began encouraging the development of a sophisticated venture capital 
industry. The industry itself then designed a number of efficient incentive schemes to 
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overcome inherent conflicts of interest between innovators, entrepreneurs, fund 
managers, and investors.
90  
New research based on European data cast doubt on the idea that channeling 
more funds into venture capital markets automatically stimulates a successful venture 
capital industry. A successful VC industry is more likely to be stimulated if the 
expected return of innovative projects were higher due to, e.g., decreased corporate or 
capital gains taxation. The existence of exit opportunities also spurs the venture 
capital industry.
91 Although the problem of information asymmetries cannot be solved 
by means of tax policy, an appropriate tax policy can trigger informal and formal 
venture capital to alleviate these problems.  
Focus should not, however, remain fixed on the venture capital industry. A 
well-developed financial sector offers a spectrum of other financial sources, ranging 
from readily available, highly liquid savings to long-term institutionalized pension 
saving schemes that severely restrict the owner’s control of the assets. In many 
countries, long-term pension savings constitute the bulk of personal savings. In 
addition, pension savings are often tax favored. Peter Drucker warned against these 
tendencies more than thirty years ago, claiming that the sharp increase of corporate 
pension plans posed a dire threat to the entrepreneurial society—it concentrated too 
much power in too few hands.
92  
Hence, the composition of savings—not just the volume—sways potential 
entrepreneurship activity in the economy. For this reason, any arrangement that 
channels savings and asset control to large institutional investors will likely limit the 
supply of financial capital to potential entrepreneurs. In 1978, the US began allowing 
pension funds to invest a portion of their assets in high-risk projects. This contributed 
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4.1.3 The labor market 
Labor market and wage-setting regulation can influence incentives for 
entrepreneurship since it restricts the freedom of contracting and therefore curtails 
possible combinations of factors of production. Labor security regulations fall more 
heavily on younger, smaller, and less capital-intensive employers. As entrepreneurial 
firms are overrepresented in these categories, labor security regulation 
disproportionally burdens entrepreneurial firms.  
As a highly regulated economy is too rigid to adapt well to changes, employment 
flexibility may be important for entrepreneurial activities. Strong regulation of the 
employment and dismissal of employees keeps entrepreneurs from adjusting their 
workforce in correspondence with market fluctuations, thereby increasing the risk of 
their projects even further.
94 As an employer determines a worker’s abilities over time, 
and as those abilities evolve with the accumulation of experience, his optimal work 
assignment will also likely change. In a flexible labor market, this often entails worker 
mobility between firms; such mobility is more likely to occur when the initial 
employment relationship was forged in a small, often young, business.  
Labor market regulation can directly influence entrepreneurial activity through 
two channels. First, a low level of labor market regulations increases the flexibility of 
high-risk entrepreneurial companies, making it more attractive to be an entrepreneur. 
Second, the relative advantage of being an employee decreases with weak 
employment protection laws, making it more favorable to undertake entrepreneurial 
projects as self-employed.
95 Generous, far-reaching labor protection laws increases an 
employee’s opportunity cost of changing employers or leaving a secure salaried job to 
become self-employed. 
The extent of labor market regulations differs greatly across countries. OECD 
has compared the extent of government regulations on labor standards by measuring 
five different aspects.
96 Of the 18 countries included in the survey, Greece and 
Sweden exhibited the highest index value (8 and 7 points). The average for all 
European countries was 4.9. The US scored a zero and Canada 2.
97 New research has 
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found that the differences in labor market regulations shape the level of nascent 
entrepreneurship more than entry regulations. Entrepreneurship tends to be higher in 
countries where it is relatively easy to hire and dismiss employees.
98  
Labor market deregulation can and has stimulated entrepreneurial activities in 
many OECD countries.
99 Small firms in the Netherlands, for example, hire fewer 
employees than needed due to the perceived cost of formal rules and regulation.
100 
New firms in the US on the other hand, expand their employee base more rapidly than 
firms in Europe.
101 Europe’s stricter employment protection laws probably induce the 
relative lack of new, rapidly growing firms in Europe.
102  
Labor market regulations thus deter and impede business activities. If regular 
employment is highly regulated, however, a strong incentive to circumvent these 
regulations may develop. Potential entrepreneurs can do so by pursuing 
entrepreneurial projects as self-employed, using only self-employed labor instead of 
hiring employees if labor is needed. Compensation and working hours are totally 
unregulated and no labor security is mandated for the self-employed. This may boost 
the level of self-employment, but it should not be interpreted as a sign of exuberant 
entrepreneurial activity. Instead, it is a costly, albeit necessary, measure to evade the 
effects of stringent labor market regulation. Part of the increase in self-employment in 
recent years in many highly regulated economies is likely driven by such 
considerations.  
Given the large intra-firm differences in productivity and productivity growth, 
wages set in negotiations away from the workplace that do not take idiosyncratic 
factors into account will impair entrepreneurial activities. Intra-firm differences are 
especially large in young and rapidly expanding industries and firms.
103 In developed 
countries, employees’ general income level is also relatively high, which in turn 
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makes the opportunity cost of leaving salaried employment to start or work in a new 
venture high as well.
104 
Very small firms can avoid unionization and collective agreements, and 
therefore benefit from greater freedom of contract. This room for maneuvering would 
likely disappear once the firm size exceeds a certain threshold, thus increasing the 
cost of expansion. This is yet another factor likely to hamper the entrepreneurial spirit 
and willingness to grow among new and small enterprises. As a result, a tightly 
regulated labor market may create a system in which a large share of economic 
activity occurs in small firms lacking the ability or the ambition to grow. Onerous 
regulation makes it difficult and risky to build large companies. Italy is a good case in 
point, where firms tend to remain small and resort to cooperating with other small 
firms in clusters.
105 By contrast, new firms in the US tend to expand their businesses 
more rapidly than the European counterparts. 
 
4.1.4 The social security system 
The social security system is closely linked to the labor market regulation discussed 
above. The establishment of public income insurance systems in combination with 
stringent labor security legislation tends to penalize individuals who assume 
entrepreneurial risk.
106 
That social security schemes in modern welfare states tend to deter 
entrepreneurial activity stems from the relative advantage of being an employee. 
Many social security benefits, such as disability, sickness, and unemployment benefits, 
are explicitly linked to formal employment. The opportunity cost of leaving a tenured 
position as an employee is high, strengthening preferences for regular employment 
and reducing the incentives for entrepreneurship.
107 Generous pension benefits paid 
by employers have a similar effect. 
However, even if it were possible to generalize the social security system, the 
self-employed and owners/managers of small entrepreneurial firms would not be able 
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to use sick or parental leave benefits, for example, in practice. Their increased 
exposure to risk and lower social security protection is a natural part of being an 
entrepreneur. Many are therefore unwilling to forgo a large part of their social 
security protection in exchange for uncertain entrepreneurial incomes. Making part of 
social insurance benefits ―portable‖ between jobs and between regular employment 
and self-employment would reduce this effect. 
Beside the differences in social security protection between employees and 
many entrepreneurs, the level of benefits may matter as well. Generous 
unemployment benefits discourage the unemployed from becoming self-employed (as 
a form of necessity entrepreneurship) and reduce the number of individuals willing to 
enter into entrepreneurial ventures as employees. In countries where the unemployed 
receive a high proportion of their former wage, the rate of new firm formation is 
lower.
108 In a study of people among Swedish business start-ups with at least three 
years of university education in science, technology or medicine, employees and 
students often preferred unemployment and further education to starting a business of 
their own when faced with unemployment.
109 
The health care insurance system poses additional problems. In many 
countries, notably the US, health insurance is tied to employment. Many workers and 
potential entrepreneurs get ―trapped‖ in large companies that provide generous health 
insurance for the employee and his/her family. Decoupling health insurance from 
employment would increase labor flexibility and reduce fears of loosing adequate 
health insurance.  
 
4.1.5 R&D, commercialization and knowledge spillover 
The successful exploitation of research and inventions combined with the transfer and 
spillover of this knowledge stimulates growth and prosperity in a modern economy.
110 
The entrepreneur plays an important role in this respect. Entrepreneursin both new 
and established venturesare responsible for recognizing unexploited opportunities 
in the market and spreading innovations by imitation and incremental improvements 
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of existing technologies.
111 An important objective of entrepreneurship policy is to 
promote this process of production and commercialization of knowledge. 
Entrepreneurship policy is often justified by noting the key importance of knowledge 
spillovers.
112 
At present, politicians of all persuasions stress ―the knowledge economy‖ and 
virtually all of them seem to have a similar policy prescription to promote this kind of 
economy: more R&D spending.
113 This idea is, however, based on an overly 
mechanical view of the economic system. Higher spending on R&D does not 
automatically produce more innovations or more entrepreneurs who start new or 
expand existing ventures. Without a well functioning entrepreneurial economy, the 
full potential from increased R&D cannot be reaped. New ideas and inventions are 
only the first step in an innovation and commercialization process. For increased 
R&D to translate into economic growth, entrepreneurs must exploit the inventions by 
introducing new products on the market or introducing new methods of production.
114  
In the worst case, quantitative goals can be a waste of money as focus and 
resources are directed towards factors which may not be exploited at all or be 
exploited elsewhere.
115 R&D spending is a factor input, not an output, and should not 
be subject to quantitative political goals. It has no such intrinsic value from an 
economic point of view. Although high R&D spending can be a necessary part of a 
successful economy of today, it is far from sufficient.
116 
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The so-called knowledge spill-over theory of entrepreneurship offers an 
alternative perspective.
117 This theory relaxes two implicit or explicit assumptions of 
earlier theories. First, it distinguishes between knowledge and ―economic knowledge‖, 
namely knowledge that is economically exploitable—more knowledge does not 
automatically translate into more economic knowledge. Second, it rejects the 
assumption that (economic) knowledge automatically spills over and induces growth. 
The entrepreneur enlivens these roles instead. They are the actors who commercialize 
inventions and thereby transform knowledge into economic knowledge, and they are 
the origin of knowledge spillover throughout the economy.  
Knowledge is often tacit, sticky, and uncertain, making it both costly and 
difficult to transmit and evaluate. As it is uncertain, the expected value and variance 
of an innovation will differ between individuals. This lays bare high profit 
opportunities for new entrepreneurial firms which incumbent firms either do not 
recognize or do not realize. Spinoffs also become possible. If incumbents fail to see 
high enough profit opportunities in ideas launched by their employees, the employees 
can instead exit the companies and start new entrepreneurial firms. 
Geographic proximity also facilitates knowledge spillover and knowledge 
transfer. If public policy promotes networks through which knowledge can easily be 
transferred between businesses and organizations, entrepreneurship is facilitated as a 
result.
118 Clusters and science parks supported by public policies make sense from this 
perspective. A Swedish study comparing new technology-based firms found a slight 
overperformance for firms situated in science parks.
119 Today’s most dynamic clusters, 
however, cannot be traced to a certain policy measure; cluster formation is a long-
term process which cannot be accelerated by means of a quick policy fix.  
An element of serendipity characterizes all cluster formations. Consequently, 
public policy plays a greater role in the later phases of cluster formation. Successful 
clusters normally emerge in response to opportunities—a successful cluster cannot be 
created by public policy. At the end of the day, the competence of creative, persistent 
entrepreneurs seems to outweigh geography in the formation of successful clusters.
120 
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However, this form of support should not be directed to specific firms. Firms must be 
self-selected and not ―picked‖ (see section 4.1.6 for further discussion).  
Public policy can instead sustain business infrastructure with different 
facilities. Google and Netscape provide two interesting examples of innovations 
originating from university campuses. Stimulating academic entrepreneurship and 
accelerating the commercialization of university-developed innovations can be one 
way to foster innovation in the economy.
121 For this to be successful, university 
faculty must encourage and stimulate entrepreneurial initiatives at the same time as 
incentives for university spinoffs remain strong. Some universities have a Technology 
Transfer Office, or TTO, an in-house organization specializing in assisting academic 
entrepreneurs in commercializing their inventions. But a TTO could also hinder the 
commercialization of useful technologies by making the process too bureaucratic and 
seeing to its own narrowly-defined proprietary interests.
122  
 
4.1.6 Targeted support  
The policies discussed so far have all been general in nature. However, more specific 
public policies can target firms (SMEs), occupations (self-employed), regions 
(underdeveloped, rural), sectors (ICT, biotech), or individual groups (women, blacks, 
immigrants, and unemployed). These groups could be perceived to be more important 
for entrepreneurship (e.g., SMEs or the ICT-sector), or found to be lacking in 
entrepreneurial activity (e.g., young people, women). 
As discussed in the opening sections, entrepreneurship policy takes a more 
general stance and tries to stimulate productive entrepreneurial initiatives independent 
of firm and individual characteristics. One should be wary of using targeted policies 
because of their negative side-effects. For instance, subsidizing small firms increases 
small firms’ cost of growth (beyond a certain threshold). If policy aims to encourage a 
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robust and dynamic business sector, such a program is largely misdirected.
123 
Supporting the unemployed also tends to have undesirable side-effects. The 
unemployed are more likely to start new ventures than their employed counterparts—
even without government support—and their ventures are more likely to fail. Pushing 
more unemployed into self-employment is unlikely to increase the success rate in this 
category and should be treated with skepticism.
124  
 
4.2 Rewards for productive entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurs generally strive for a combination of wealth, power, and prestige.
125 
Low costs to start and expand a business alone will not entice an entrepreneur to 
exploit an opportunity; the expected reward must be large enough to compensate for 
the opportunity costs and uncertainty incurred.
126 This section discusses how public 
policy can stimulate entrepreneurship by rewarding productive entrepreneurship. Tax 
policy plays a major role in this respect, and its effects constitute a substantial part of 
this section as a result. 
 
4.2.1 Property rights 
Private property rightsthe existence of legal titles to hold property and the 
protection thereofis arguably our most fundamental economic institution.
127 The 
establishment of secure and stable property rights steered the long-term development 
of Western countries.
128 Secure property rights ensure that physical objects can be 
turned into capital, a transformation that requires judgment, imagination, and 
innovation.
129 Without control over assets and their returns, a potential entrepreneur 
will lack the incentive to innovate.
130 In countries with weak property rights, 
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entrepreneurs are discouraged from reinvesting retained earnings in their ventures.
131 
The division and specialization of labor are also hampered, which narrows the range 
of potential entrepreneurial discoveries.  
Moreover, weak property rights (and the protection thereof) stimulate 
unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship. If the protection of property rights is 
sufficiently weak, destructive entrepreneurship, such as extortion and corruption, will 
be promoted. Hence, in light of insufficient and inadequate laws to protect and 
ascertain private property rights, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship is 
strengthened relative to productive entrepreneurship. Organized crime syndicates and 
the mafia, for example, are often innovative in their response to shortcomings in the 
legal enforcement framework, and pursue entrepreneurship as a substitute for absent 
or maladaptive public institutions. The Sicilian mafia and criminal organizations in 
Japan illustrate that these activities are not necessarily negative for the economy, 
given the context within which they are carried out.
132  
Intellectual property rights and patent legislation are important questions in 
this area. We will discuss this issue in section 4.4.1.  
 
4.2.2 Taxation 
The tax system represents a key public policy tool in setting the level of rewards of 
entrepreneurship. The extent and design of the tax system affects the net return to 
entrepreneurship both directly and indirectly. It determines a potential entrepreneur’s 
risk-reward profile and consequently his incentives for undertaking entrepreneurial 
activities as well. Even if non-pecuniary rewards unaffected by taxes (such as 
autonomy and individual flexibility) also matter, the financial effects from taxation 
cannot be neglected. Extensive research has analyzed theoretical and empirical effects 
of the tax system; its effects are, however, often complex and sometimes counter-
intuitive. 
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entrepreneurs. 
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From a theoretical point of view, the tax system affects entrepreneurial activity 
through a variety of mechanisms. The theoretical literature identifies four main 
channels: (1) an absolute effect affecting the supply and effort of potential 
entrepreneurs in the economy; (2) a relative effect affecting an individual’s choice of 
occupation and organisational form; (3) an evasion effect affecting the willingness to 
become an entrepreneur to take advantage of opportunities to decrease the tax burden; 
and (4) an insurance effect affecting the amount of risk people are willing to assume 
and hence the likelihood of undertaking entrepreneurial activities.
133 We will discuss 
each of these effects below.  
The absolute effect of a tax makes it more expensive to start or expand a 
business; an absolute increase of taxation of entrepreneurs lowers the (expected) after 
tax reward. It also makes expansion financed by retained earnings more difficult and 
negatively affects the liquidity position of an entrepreneur. A lower after tax return or 
higher expansion costs discourages entrepreneurial activities and impedes new start-
ups and the expansion of firms.
134  
Taxation may also alter the relative return of different activities if it favors one 
form of employment over another. As a result, a higher tax rate may encourage 
income shifting and thus positively influence (some form of) entrepreneurship in the 
economy.  
The evasion effect arises if evading taxes on entrepreneurial income either 
illegally or legally is simpler than paying them. This often proves true for 
entrepreneurs working as self-employed.
135 It may be easier for self-employed to 
underreport income by avoiding registration of cash sales or to overstate costs by 
recording private expenses as business costs, or to frequently use more informal 
agreements that are hard for the tax authority to verify or disclose. A Swedish study 
estimates that the self-employed underreport their income by 30 per cent.
136 Higher 
taxes may, as a result, encourage entrepreneurship (i.e., self-employment). When a 
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business expands above a certain level, it becomes more difficult to exploit such tax 
avoidance opportunities.
137  
Lastly, the insurance effect claims that taxation (with full loss offset) functions 
as insurance that stimulates risk-taking.
138 When applied to entrepreneurship, an 
increased tax on the net return together with full loss offset will reduce the after tax 
variance of profits and hence the risk associated with the business. If potential 
entrepreneurs are risk averse, this risk reduction may stimulate entrepreneurship.
139 
However, the rate of tax progression may also matter. The insurance effect 
assumes a proportional tax rate with full loss offset. Given that entrepreneurial 
incomes are more variable than salaried income, the average tax will be higher for 
entrepreneurs in a progressive tax system. A highly progressive tax system with 
imperfect loss offset therefore deters entrepreneurial business entry.
140 High marginal 
tax on entrepreneurial income (for high incomes) penalizes gazelles, or high-growth 
entrepreneurial ventures.
141 
In sum, theory argues for both a positive and a negative relationship between 
taxation and entrepreneurship. Bearing in mind the difference between unproductive 
and productive entrepreneurship, the positive effects seem mainly to encourage 
unproductive (or destructive) entrepreneurship and non-entrepreneurial self-
employment. Productive entrepreneurship has little to do with people who start their 
own ventures to avoid paying higher taxes. Rather, this effect likely reduces 
opportunities for legitimate and productive entrepreneurship.
142  
As the theoretical models give ambiguous results, we must look to empirical 
research to determine which is the dominant effect. However, empirical findings are 
still ambiguous in this respect. A great deal of empirical research analyzes taxation 
and entrepreneurship, but much lacks a satisfactory measure of entrepreneurship. 
Nearly all studies within the literature of empirical entrepreneurship struggle to define 
and quantify entrepreneurship. Self-employment levels are often used as a proxy 
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because they are readily available and of relatively good quality over time and across 
countries, but this is a crude measure of entrepreneurship (as discussed in section 2). 
As a consequence, empirical results must be interpreted with caution. Taxation’s 
positive or negative effect on self-employment levels does not indicate the same effect 
on truly entrepreneurial activity in general or productive entrepreneurial activity in 
particular.  
The empirical results conflict at first glance, as both negative, positive and no 
effects are found.
143 Parker (1996) and Schuetze (2000) find a positive effect (i.e., 
higher tax rate increases entrepreneurial activity), for example, whereas Moore (2004) 
observes a negative effect. Many studies also find no or only negligible effects from 
taxation (e.g., Stenkula 2009). OECD (2007) concludes that no simple relationship 
between low tax rates and the level of entrepreneurship can be established. Given the 
complexity of the tax code in a typical OECD country, the incentive effects of the tax 
code on entrepreneurial behavior are highly complex. A more detailed examination of 
the research illustrates that the average tax rate likely has a positive effect whereas the 
marginal tax rate likely has a negative effect.
144 As stated earlier, a higher tax 
progression may also deter entrepreneurial activities.
145 
Many studies within this field often analyze the effect of one specific tax, like 
the tax on earned income, or use an overall aggregate tax measure, like taxes as a 
share of GDP. But what one should really analyze is taxes on entrepreneurial income. 
In practice, no specific tax on income from entrepreneurial effort exists. From a tax 
perspective, entrepreneurial income can be taxed in many different forms, including 
labor income, business income, current capital income (dividends and interest), or 
capital gains. These taxes may affect entrepreneurial activities in different ways. A 
thorough analysis of the effects of taxation on entrepreneurship must disentangle these 
effects. 
To begin with, entrepreneurs can often choose their business form and its 
associated taxation. Income from labor and unincorporated businesses (business 
income) are often taxed in the same way—the sum of labor income and business 
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income is normally called earned income. As long as tax rates from earned income are 
higher than corporate tax rates (as is typically the case) and new ventures experience 
tax-deductible losses in the beginning (as tends to be the case), entrepreneurs will 
generally choose to start a new business as an unincorporated business. When the 
company is profitable at a later stage, the entrepreneur may want to incorporate the 
business. As a result of these differences, an increase of the earned income tax rate 
relative to the corporate income tax rate may actually encourage new ventures.
146 A 
high tax on earned income makes the initial loss of a new venture less burdensome. 
(As discussed above, it may also be easier to avoid taxes as an entrepreneur in small 
or new businesses.)  
However, income from entrepreneurial effort may be taxed as earned income 
to a larger extent than described above. First, the tax code may restrict the extent 
income accrued from closely held incorporated companies may be taxed as first 
corporate and then capital income at the personal level.
147 Second, a great deal of the 
entrepreneurial function is carried out by employees without an ownership stake in the 
firm, for whom the earned income tax schedule is always applicable. For these 
categories, a high tax on earned income may have negative incentive effects.  
High labor tax rates may also impede the emergence of a large, efficient 
service sector. Many activities within the household service sector are labor intensive 
tasks that can also be performed by unpaid household members themselves. High 
labor tax rates make it difficult to compete successfully with unpaid household 
production; consequently, commercial exploitation and entrepreneurial business 
development occur less often.
148 
Payroll taxes are normally included in discussions of labor taxation. High 
payroll taxes deter entrepreneurs from hiring employees if wage costs are too high (if 
the incidence of the payroll tax is on the employer/entrepreneur) or the net wage too 
low (if the incidence of the payroll tax is on the employee), or a combination of these 
two effects (if part of the incidence is on the employer and part on the employee). 
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High payroll taxes could also discourage development within the service sector in the 
same way as the regular labor income tax.  
Turning to capital and corporate taxation, a high tax rate on business profits 
discourages equity financing and spurs debt financing. To the extent that debt 
financing is less costly and more available for larger firms, high corporate tax rates 
coupled with tax-deductible interest payments disadvantage smaller firms and 
potential entrepreneurs.
149 Taxing corporate profits also reduces the amount of 
retained earning that can be used to expand the existing venture. Research has shown 
that taxing profits in small firms often leads to lower growth rates.
150 A higher tax rate 
on dividends encourages the reliance on retained earnings for financing expansion. 
This punishes new ventures, locks in retained earnings, and traps capital in incumbent 
firms. This could reduce the flow of capital into the most promising projects, as it 
favors projects in incumbent ventures.
151  
Most of the economic return from successful high-impact entrepreneurial 
firms comes as steeply increased stock market value rather than as dividends or large 
interest payments to the owners. As a result, the taxation of capital gains on stock 
holdings greatly affects the incentives for potential high-impact entrepreneurs.
152 
Successful entrepreneurs are also highly sensitive to wealth, property, and inheritance 
taxes.
153 Certain assets are exempted from taxation in many countries, such as 
corporate wealth or pension savings, and the imputed value used as the basis for 
assessments is often based on arbitrary calculation rules. These rules may spur (like 
corporate wealth exemption) or discourage (like pension savings exemption) 
investments in entrepreneurial activities.  
Stock options can be used to encourage and reward individuals who supply 
key competencies to a firm. In ideal circumstances, this would provide incentives that 
closely mimic direct ownership. This is most important for entrepreneurs in certain 
industries in which options are an effective response to agency problems. 
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The efficiency of stock options greatly depends on the tax code. If gains on stock 
options are taxed as wage income, some of the incentive effect is lost. This becomes 
particularly true if the gains are subject to (uncapped) social security contributions 
and if the marginal tax rate on wage income is high. 
The situation changes dramatically if an employee with stock options can defer 
the tax liability to when the stocks are eventually sold. The effectiveness is reinforced 
further if the employee suffers no tax consequences upon the granting or the exercise 
of the option and if the employee is taxed at a low capital gains rate when the acquired 
stock is sold. The US changed the tax code in the early 1980s along these lines, 
paving the way for a wave of entrepreneurial ventures in Silicon Valley and 
elsewhere.
154 
In order to calculate the total effect of taxation, one must consider corporate 
taxation’s specific rules for depreciation and valuation and the taxation of interest 
income, dividends, capital gains, and wealth. The effective total tax rates also depend 
on ownership category.
155 In many developed countries, business ownership positions 
held directly by individuals and families have been taxed much more heavily than 
other ownership categories. The wave of tax reforms that swept the OECD in the 
1980s smoothed over many of these differences.
156 Those that still persist, however, 
spur an endogenous response in the ownership structure of the business sector towards 
the tax-favored owner categories.
157 If individual stock holdings are disfavored 
relative to institutional holdings and institutions are less willing to invest in small and 
new entrepreneurial projects, entrepreneurial activity could be hampered.
158 
Finally, we must stress the importance of looking at the whole picture. Taxing 
citizens in an economy has several purposes, like financing public and merit goods, 
redistributing incomes, or controlling aggregate demand. A tax system should be 
efficient, transparent, and equitable. Policymakers should take all these aspects into 
consideration when designing the tax system—entrepreneurial effects are just one of 
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many relevant aspects.
159 Nevertheless, it is important to understand and consider the 
effect of taxes on entrepreneurial activity when designing and reforming a tax system. 
The design of a tax system may otherwise dampen entrepreneurial activity in the 
economy. 
 
4.3 Disincentives for unproductive entrepreneurship 
If institutions are such that it is beneficial for individuals to spend entrepreneurial 
effort on circumventing them, individuals will do so rather than benefiting from given 
institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance contracts and product quality. In this 
case, corruption and predatory activities prevail over socially productive 
entrepreneurship. As discussed in section 4.2, the institutional framework must offer 
rewards to productive entrepreneurship. Moreover, the institutional framework should 
also weaken or ideally eliminate incentives for unproductive or destructive 
entrepreneurial activities. 
A complex and ill-conceived tax system forces entrepreneurs to waste time 
and effort on tax issues, while a tax system with high tax rates increases the incentive 
to evade taxes. Entry barriers and high regulatory burdens can have the same negative 
effect. 
 
4.3.1 Bankruptcy law 
If the economy is to evolve and develop, unsuccessful and unproductive 
entrepreneurial ventures must close down so that their resources can be redirected to 
more productive uses. The institutional framework must hence make it easy to close 
down or reconstruct ventures.
160  
However, all failed projects should not be considered a waste of resources, as 
discussed earlier. Bankruptcies themselves are not unproductive (or destructive) 
entrepreneurship. Failed firms can create value for the economy as their very failure 
gives information to other agents; moreover, the knowledge generated/created by 
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these firms can often be used by other firms. Restructuring a failed venture with new 
management may also result in improvements, for example. Knowledge from failed 
projects and ideas often can underlie the success of other ventures.
161 The restriction 
or delay of this process by stringent bankruptcy regulation harms knowledge 
generation and development.  
From an individual point of view, stringent bankruptcy laws discourage 
potential entrepreneurs because they increase the perceived cost of starting a business. 
A new business can always fail. As business formation, selection, and destruction 
often include a positive information and knowledge externality that the potential 
entrepreneur does not consider when starting a business, relatively generous 
bankruptcy laws seem reasonable. Examples include discharge clauses, postponement 
of debts, and the possibility of restructuring. Discharge clauses allow the debtor to 
cancel some debt, although its use varies from country to country. On the other hand, 
overly generous bankruptcy laws encourage exploitation and destructive 
entrepreneurship and may directly damage creditors while indirectly harming the rest 
of the community.
162  
Non-financial effects cause additional concerns. Psychological costs often 
accompany bankruptcies, and many countries exhibit negative public attitudes 
towards business failures.
163 This stigma may discourage people from entrepreneurial 
activities despite good chances to succeed and prosper economically. Some countries 
like the United States, however, look more favorably upon failed business projects.
164  
Business culture must also give failed entrepreneurs a ―second chance‖ and 
allow them to start anew. These entrepreneurs have often accumulated valuable 
experience and business networks that increase their probability of success in the 
future. Empirical research also shows that so-called habitual or serial entrepreneurs 
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are more successful.
165 Great business potential stems thus from re-starters, but 
cultural differences and institutions influence failed entrepreneurs’ willingness to try 
new projects.  
 
4.4. Incentives to keep the winners on their toes 
The formation of successful ventures is necessary for economic progress—yet it is far 
from sufficient. Initial success can become stagnation in later stages. There is no 
guarantee that entrepreneurial ventures will continue to innovate and successfully 
evolve. Many large companies use their power and financial strength to protect 
themselves from competitors, thereby thwarting the entrepreneurial spirit found both 
within the firm and among potential competitors. The institutional framework should 
therefore foster an entrepreneurial economy that compels the old ―winners‖ to 
continue to perform.
166 
To this end, public policy has traditionally constrained ―big business‖ in order 
to ensure that large companies do not abuse their market power. This is often an ill-
conceived approach, frequently involving lengthy legal processes with unpredictable 
outcomes. Alternatively, the government could attack the problem from the other 
direction: stimulate new and small businesses (or foreign firms), instead of trying to 
punish and restrain large companies.
167  
 
4.4.1 Intellectual property rights 
The intellectual property rights system is an interesting example of how a second-best 
solution bears far-reaching consequences for entrepreneurial activities. In principle, 
property rights should encourage innovation and entrepreneurs. Yet a difficult trade-
off in the legal system must be made, and finding the right balance can be problematic. 
On the one hand, it is important to protect entrepreneurial ideas and ensure that 
entrepreneurs have the opportunity to reap the benefits of their own entrepreneurial 
                                                 
165 See Ucbasaran et al. (2008) for an overview of habitual entrepreneurs.  
166 See Baumol et al. (2007) for a further and more detailed discussion. 
167 Gilbert et al. (2004).   41 
activities and projects. On the other hand, such exclusive monopoly privileges render 
protectionist entrepreneurial initiatives and impede healthy competition.  
If protection is overly strong—if its time frame is too long or is too easy to 
obtain (including inventions which are not truly novel)—the initial entrepreneur will 
be able to extract excessive monopoly rents. This will definitely not keep winners ―on 
their toes‖; the economy could become less competitive and less innovative in 
response. Yet, if protection is too weak, or if it can be circumvented too easily 
(through unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship), there is no incentive to 
introduce innovations in the first place.
168 
In recent years, the protection of intellectual property has been strengthened in 
ways that increase both the cost and risk associated with innovative activity. 
Numerous studies claim that intellectual property rights protection laws have become 
too protective, notably in the US.
169 This excessive protection could impede 
productive entrepreneurship, but it also spurs evasive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship to circumvent and to exploit the excessive protection of intellectual 
property. The system then functions as a tax on innovation, in that both the risk and 
the expected expense associated with innovative activity rises sharply.  
 
4.4.2 Trade and regulation 
Policies that inhibit new entry and subsidize specific companies or industries clearly 
cause stagnation. Willingness to engage in risky entrepreneurial projects declines 
sharply in an economy lacking the threat of new competitors. Sheltering domestic 
firms from foreign competition dampens innovative activity in already developed 
economies.  
However, a dominant, formerly successful firm in a market will not 
necessarily stop innovating. In a contestable market with no (or low) entry and exit 
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costs, the incentive to innovate may still be present.
170 Low entry barriers, as 
discussed in section 4.1.1, then become crucial.  
Even with low entry barriers, the number of firms in the market may be 
limited by the extent of the domestic market; in combination with economies of scale 
(and scope) and high sunk entry costs, the interplay pressures incumbents too little. In 
this case, international trade can stimulate the competition and contestability of the 
market as incumbent firms are exposed to international competitors. The market 
expands at the same time as foreign firms may already have incurred the necessary 
sunk costs. As a result, international competition can spur the domestic innovation 
process as long as the domestic economy is not sheltered from competition from 
foreign firms. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
The successful commercialization of an innovation requires a chain of agents that 
work together in order to develop a high-impact firm. Entrepreneurship is arguably 
the most important. In this chapter, we have examined policy areas and policy 
measures that foster a favorable environment for high-impact entrepreneurship.  
Our analysis emphasizes the complementary character of institutions. If 
policymakers would like to improve conditions for high-impact entrepreneurship, a 
wide array of complementary institutional reforms should be adopted.  
We have identified and categorized institutions important for productive 
entrepreneurship in general and high-impact entrepreneurship in particular, based on 
Baumol et al.’s (2007) four tenets of an entrepreneurial economy. According to 
Baumol et al. (2007), a successful entrepreneurial economy is characterized by (1) 
ease of starting and expanding a business; (2) rewards for productive entrepreneurial 
activity; (3) disincentives for unproductive activity; and (4) incentives to keep the 
winners on their toes. 
Based on the above classification, we have discussed eleven public policy areas, 
including seemingly disparate areas such as the design of the social security system 
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and the extent of intellectual property rights. We identify a number of distortions 
within these policy areas that could disfavor productive and high-impact 
entrepreneurship. In particular, we have analyzed the importance of regulatory entry 
and growth barriers, labor market regulation, liquidity constraints, and tax policy in 
depth.  
This chapter discusses entrepreneurship policy rather than SME policy. 
Entrepreneurship policy aims to support socially productive entrepreneurial activity, 
independent of business form. SME policy is a much narrower concept and includes 
specific support to encourage distinct groups or firms, such as SMEs and the self-
employed. It often involves the creation of specific government agencies as well as 
targeted subsidies. Part of industrial policy in developed countries can certainly be 
characterized as SME policy during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Table 2 about here 
Table 2 summarizes the issues discussed in this chapter and their ensuing policy 
conclusions. Under each policy area, we list public policies that contribute to an 
―entrepreneurial economy‖ and a ―managed economy‖. It should be stressed that 
many institutions and policy measures reinforce the effects pushing the system in 
either the managed or entrepreneurial direction. 
Finally, we must keep in mind that each country has its own unique characteristics 
that cannot be easily replicated or imitated by public policies. Therefore, we abstain 
from ranking policies or identifying the ―best‖ policy combination. Such identification 
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on their toes 
Section  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4 




x    (x)  (x) 
Liquidity and capital 
constraints  x       
Labor market  x       




x  (x)    (x) 
Targeted support  x      (x) 
Property rights  (x)  x     
Taxation  (x)  x  (x)   
Bankruptcy laws  (x)    x   
Intellectual property 
rights    (x)    x 
Trade and regulation  (x)      x 
Note: All public policies can be relevant for more than one of Baumol et al’s four tenets. In that case 
the tenet which is deemed to be the most important is marked with an X, while other tenet/tenets of 
lesser relevance are marked with an (X). The respective policies will be discussed in the section seen as 
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Table 2. Public policy supporting an entrepreneurial economy vs. a managed economy 
 
Public policy  Managed economy  Entrepreneurial 
economy 
Regulatory entry and growth 
barriers: 
   
– Entry barriers  High  Low 
– Production of welfare 
services/merit goods 
Government production  Sizeable private 
production, contestability 
– Financing of welfare 
services/merit goods 
Tax financing only  Government ensures basic 
high quality supply, then 
private financing 
– Profit-driven organizations   Partly de facto prohibited 
in key areas facing 
income-elastic demand 
Fully allowed 
     
Liquidity and capital constraints:   
– Wealth formation  High levels of income 
redistribution and wealth 
tax 
Support private wealth 
formation 
– Venture capital  Direct support  Indirect support 
     
Labor market:     
– Labor security mandates   Tied to years of tenure  Portability of tenure rights 
– Wage-setting arrangements  Centralized and closely 
tied to formal criteria 
Decentralized and 
individualized 
     
Social security:     
– Design  Tied to employment  Portability of tenure rights 
     
R&D, commercialization and knowledge spillover:   
– Focus  Quantitative goals of input 
(spending on R&D) 
No quantitative goals, 
indirect support, enabling 
and general 
Targeted support  Yes  No 
Property rights  Weak  Stable and secure   53 
Table 2. Continued 
 
Taxation:     
– Earned income tax rate  High and progressive  Low or moderate 
– Capital income tax rate  High  Low 
– Capital gains tax rate   High  Low 
– Tax on stock options  High  Low 
– Degree of tax neutrality across 
owner categories 
Favor institutional owners 
over individuals 
Neutrality 
– Degree of neutrality across 
sources of finance 
Favor debt over equity  Neutrality 
– Personal taxation of asset 
holdings 
Yes, in particular on equity  No, or exemption for 
equity holdings 
– Corporate tax rate  High statutory rate, low 
effective rate  
Low or moderate statutory 
rate, effective rate equal to 
statutory rate, and neutral 
across types of firms and 
industries 
Bankruptcy laws  Onerous and lengthy  Generous, allow for a 
―second chance‖  
Intellectual property rights  Very strong, easily 
obtained 
Balance inventors’ 
interests against need for 
knowledge dissemination 
Trade and regulation  Protect national and 
incumbent firms 
Openness 